August 2009

A Huge 10-Game Stretch

I find that almost everyone who blogs about sports inevitably determines that some stretch of games is “pivotal” to the success of a team’s season.  Some plug it early to help define a season.  Others wait until the final stretch where absolute numbers seems to come down to a couple of late games.  Still others find the most pressing/difficult stretch of games to see how a team produces.  Not to be left in the dust, I propose that the next 10 games for the Braves will likely make or break their season.  First, let’s look at what games lie ahead:

Home: 3 games vs. the San Diego Padres

Away: 3 games vs. the Philadelphia Phillies, 4 games vs. the Florida Marlins

As of midnight on 8/24/2009. the Braves trail the Phillies by 6.5 games (8 back in the loss column) in the N.L. East.  With respect to the Wild Card, the Braves trail the Colorado Rockies by 4 and the San Francisco Giants by 3.  We currently have 38 games left in the regular season to make our mark.  By the end of the next 10 games, the Braves will have just 28 games to make any sort of a push and a much smaller margin of error from which to work. 

Here’s why I believe the next 10 games are so important to the season:

3 versus the worst team in the N.L.:

Atlanta starts this stretch versus the Padres who, in my opinion, are the worst team in the National League (if not baseball).  True, the Washington Nationals have a worse record, but let’s consider a few things: 1) The Padres have scored the fewest runs in the Major Leagues this year.  2) Only the Nationals have given up more runs than the Padres in the N.L, and only 4 teams in all of the Majors have given up more runs. 3) The Padres -155 run differential is the worst in the Majors and only Kansas City (-137) are even close. 4) Since the beginning of the season, the Padres have lost Jake Peavy, Chris Young, Brian Giles, and Scott Harriston among others….the team’s really only gotten worse. 

This is a tailor made opportunity for a team like Atlanta to make a mark.  The Padres aren’t  just bad, they’re the worst team in baseball.  If Atlanta can sweep anybody, it should be the San Diego Padres, at home, when they’re the only team playing for anything in the series.

3 versus the team they’re chasing in the N.L. East:

The Braves have played very well versus the Phillies overall this year.  They were helped out at home in the most recent series versus the Phillies when Brad Lidge grabbed a loss from the jaws of victory which would have lead to a Phillies sweep assuming all other things remained constant.  After this week, the Braves have just 3 more games versus the team they’re directly chasing in the N.L. East (Sept. 18-20), and now is the time to strike and provide a greater reason to believe that late September season will remain important. A sweep could potentially leave the Braves nearly 10 games back (and even more in the loss column) and all but end any thought of a divisional crown.

4 versus an inner-division foe and competitor in the Wild Card Race:

Atlanta just finished taking 2-3 from the Marlins, and now we have to turn around and face them 4 more times down in Florida.  The series this weekend was incredibly tight providing every reason to believe these two teams are very evenly matched.  From an emotional standpoint, a sweep or taking 3/4 against the Marlins again this week could effectively 1) bury the Marlins from true consideration in the N.L. East and 2) give the Braves a serious leg up in the Wild Card at least when it comes to outpacing the Marlins while also demoralizing a rather young and inexperienced group that currently calls Landshark Stadium their home field.

The fact is, Atlanta has no games left versus the Giants or Rockies meaning the best we can do is beat up on the other teams closest in the Wild Card standings to ourselves and hope for good results with respect to those opponents.  It’s not ideal, but as the situation stands, the 4 game series versus the Marlins looms large.

Now, some readers who read my “Taking Adages to Task: Parts I and II” might believe that I’m contradicting myself from my previous posts as my message in those posts was essentially that games versus the bad teams and games versus your division don’t matter anymore than the rest of the games.  This is true, but misses the more important point I was making by doing that research, which is (again): Good teams win, bad teams lose regardless of the opponent.  What those posts revealed is that rarely does a team outshine its own ability in such situations but instead tends to mirror the ability of the team overall.  Well, Atlanta’s got a 10-game stretch right now solely against sub-.500 opponents and inner division opponents which a good team will take advantage of and simultaneously up its performance versus those sub-categories of opponents. 

The truth of the matter is now is moving time. While a medicore stretch won’t kill the team, it does make the path infinitely harder. With a 6.5 game lead to overcome inner-division and a 4-game lead and 2 teams to overcome in the Wild Card a 5-5 10 game stretch would likely leave the Braves in no better (if not worse) position with 10 fewer games remaining to make up the difference.  By contrast, a say 8-2 stretch might cut the Phillies lead in half and bring the Braves within just a game or two of the Wild Card which makes the road going forward more interesting.

Since everybody gets to claim a 10-game stretch as the stretch, be on notice:  I contend that by the end of the 4 game series with the Marlins, we’ll know whether Atlanta’s got a shot this year or not.  

Taking Adages to Task: Part II

The Braves and Phillies begin what is being hyped up as a pivotal series this weekend.  No doubt it is.  The Braves need to do well in the series in order to stay viable for an N.L. East Division title.  Head-to-head match-ups are all the more compelling because the swing is more direct.  If you win, the team you need to lose does in fact lose.  This is not necessarily true at any other point in the season.  Of course, a team should always want to win….and this raises the question:  Is this series in the grand scheme of the season anymore important because it’s inner-division versus the team you’re chasing?  From a psychological standpoint, I can appreciate the argument that a later season match-up such as this one is more important.  Since we can’t actually measure “psychological” effect, I now present to you Part II of my “Taking Adages to Task” series. 

 

Today I focus on the second adage: You’ve gotta win games versus the teams in your division.  Again, the goal is not prove/disprove whether this is facially true because it is.  The question I’m addressing is whether these games mean more or seem to make or break a team.  For a run down of what is and is not included in my study, please see my post from 8/8/2009 titled: “Taking Adages to Task: Part I.”  Note:  I did update the 2009 percentages to be current going into action on 8/14/2009.   I wanted to in particular see whether there was an appreciable difference in the data between the 1991-2005 Braves (What I call the “Dynasty” Braves) and the 2006-2009 Braves (The “Modern” Braves).  Without further adieu, here is what I found:

 

The first thing I was interested in doing was basically replicating what I did in Part I by comparing the Braves teams’ winning percentage in a given season versus their winning percentage inner-division in the same season.  Table 1 shows the results for the “Dynasty” Braves, while Table 2 shows the results for the “Modern” Braves.  The numbers indicate a very similar pattern to those discovered for the Braves’ performance versus sub-.500 teams.  Regardless of whether the team is winning pennants or hovering in mediocrity, they generally do very similar inner-division to how they do overall.  Of the 18 seasons I looked at, in eleven seasons the team won at the same rate inner-division as overall within 3 percentage points. Regardless of the differential, the team “outperformed” in 50% of the seasons and “underperformed” in 50% of the seasons. The same holds true for the Braves’ run of 14 division titles.  In 50% they “outperformed,” and in 50% they “underperformed.” 

 

I’ll now show the tables and then discuss the data a bit more.

 

Table 1:  1991-2005 Braves Record/Win Percentage Overall Compared to Versus Division. 

 

Year

Overall Record

vs. Division

Win Pct. Overall

Win Pct. vs. Division

1991

94 – 68

51-39

58.0%

56.67%

1992

98 – 64

58-32

60.5%

64.44%

1993

104 – 58

55-23

64.2%

70.51%

1994

NA

NA

NA

NA

1995

90 – 54

31-21

62.5%

59.62%

1996

96 – 66

32-20

59.3%

61.54%

1997

101 – 61

29-19

62.3%

60.42%

1998

106 – 56

30-18

65.4%

62.5%

1999

103 – 59

35-16

63.6%

68.63%

2000

95 – 67

27-24

58.6%

52.94%

2001

88 – 74

42-34

54.3%

55.26%

2002

101 – 59

47-28

63.1%

62.67%

2003

101 – 61

41-35

62.3%

53.95%

2004

96 – 66

51-25

59.3%

67.11%

2005

90 – 72

42-33

55.6%

56%

 

Table 2:  2006-2009 Braves Record/Win Percentage Overall Compared to Versus Division

 

Year

Overall Record

vs. Division

Win Pct. Overall

Win Pct. vs. Division

2006

79 – 83

35-38

48.8%

47.95%

2007

84 – 78

39-33

51.9%

54.17%

2008

72 – 90

31-41

44.4%

43.06%

2009

60-54

22-15

52.6%

59.46%

 

Seasons WPctDiv = WPctOver (within 3 points):                                                   11

Seasons WPctDiv  >  WPctOver:                                                                              9

Seasons WPctOver > WPct Div:                                                                               9

 

Comparing the “Dynasty” to the “Modern”: 

What the data demonstrates is that success or failure was not determined by the play inner-division.  Sure, the team faired worse inner-division, but the same rings true overall.  While the use of unbalanced schedules in the “Modern” era means that inner-division results matter more, they don’t demonstrate the Braves were otherwise doing any better versus the Central, West, or in Interleague during the time period.  Additionally, the 1991-1993 Braves who played in a two-division National League actually had an even greater impact occur inner-division, and yet, there’s not a drastic change in the results.  The adage simply doesn’t hold up because inner-division games only tend to reflect a team’s overall success rather than define it.

 

The next thing I wanted to know was whether the Braves’ performance inner-division could ever be said to be a determinative factor in one of their division titles.  “Determinative” is a bit of a misnomer as so many things go into a season that trying to claim that a particular sub-set of stats or results is the determinative factor is nearly impossible.  Nonetheless, I looked at the “Dynasty” Braves to see where we might be able to claim that inner-division performance really made the difference.  What I did was look at the 1991-2005 timeframe and then reduced the seasons considered to those 7 seasons where the Braves “outperformed” their overall win percentage inner-division.  I did this because those are the only 7 seasons that we can possibly attribute their eventual title to the performance inner-division.  In the other 7 seasons performance within the division actually reduced the number of wins they had.

 

In order to evaluate the seasons, I kept the number of games played inner-division constant and then reduced the win total inner-division so that the Braves’ winning percentage in that subset was equal to or lower than their overall winning percentage.  Table 3 presents this data.  You’ll see in the Table the number of games the Braves won the division by in the 3rd column.  The last column indicates the number of extra wins they received by outperforming within their division:

 

Table 3:  “Dynasty Braves” Division Pennants in Seasons With Increased Inner-Division Win Percentage

 

Year

Overall Record

Games Div. Won By:

Win Pct. Overall

Win Pct. vs. Division

Games Extra Div.

1992

98 – 64

8

60.5%

64.44%

4

1993

104 – 58

1

64.2%

70.51%

5

1996

96 – 66

8

59.3%

61.54%

1

1999

103 – 59

6.5

63.6%

68.63%

2-3

2001

88 – 74

2

54.3%

55.26%

< 1

2004

96 – 66

10

59.3%

67.11%

6

2005

90 – 72

2

55.6%

56%

< 1

 

So what does this table mean, and more importantly, what does the one bolded row mean?  The one bolded row, the 1993 season, represents the only season in the Braves 14 year run that we can possibly attribute directly the Braves’ inner-division success to the eventual division title.  That 1993 year was the only time in the Braves’ 14 consecutive division titles that the team picked up enough additional wins inner-division to make the difference for a division title.  Of course, since the 1993 season was decided by just 1 game, there are a myriad of subcategories that we might look at to represent the difference between winning and losing the division.  2001 and 2005 were both very close pennant races, and yet the Braves’ performance inner-division in those seasons are two of the closest comparisons that are found in the entire set.

 

From a sentimental/nostalgic standpoint, that 1993 season was incredibly memorable as the pennant was decided on the 162nd game of the season.  The Braves defeated the (then inner-division) Colorado Rockies while the (then inner-division) San Francisco Giants lost to the (then inner-division) Los Angeles Dodgers to give the Braves their third-straight division title.  Such dramatic and memorable moments are probably a major reason why sportswriters and fans focus so much on inner-division opponents.  What I believe my data reveals though is that situation had more to do with luck and circumstance (though MLB generally does try to have inner-division games late in the season), then with the increased importance of such games.

 

The final thing I wanted to know was whether the “Dynasty” Braves did something unique inner-division that the “Modern” Braves have not done.  The results here are somewhat mixed.  Table 4 shows the winning percentages versus the teams in the division based off of where the opponent finished in the division.  I’ll again note that I did not include the 1994 season in this data as it just seemed like an outlier for the 1991-2005 set on the whole:

 

Table 4:  Braves Win Percentages versus Inner-Division Opponents:

 

v. Final Standing

“Dynasty” 1991-2005

“Modern” 2006-2009***

1st Place

NA

42.86%

2nd Place

53.88%

50.79%

3rd Place

58.06%

55.56%

4th Place

61.36%

53.33%

5th Place

65.91%

52.31%

6th Place*

77.55%

NA

7th Place**

69.23%

NA

                        * – Accounts for the years of 1991-1993 when there were two divisions

                        ** – Accounts for 1993 versus the then expansion Rockies

                        *** – 2009 based on: Phillies (1), Marlins (2), Braves (3), Mets (4), Nationals (5)

 

I think what Table 4 demonstrates is that the Braves’ performance overall cannot be pegged down based on their performance versus inner-division opponents.  The “Modern” Braves have a cumulative winning percentage of 49.17%, and that’s basically what they’ve done inner-division.  The major difference being that they don’t beat up on the lesser-teams at the same rate as they did when they were winning division titles.  To me, the most notable thing is that inner-division the Braves no longer demonstrate the same upward success as the opponent gets worse inner-division as they did when they were in the “Dynasty” period.  During the “Dynasty” period, the Braves showed an ability to really dominate the bad teams in the division essentially averaging a 2-1 three game series versus the 4th-7th place teams.  The “Modern” Braves have not had that same average.  What we might be able to say is that the “Modern” Braves fail at beating up on the inner-division sub-.500 opponents the way we did when a division pennant was the norm. 

 

Conclusion:  I’ll keep this short.  What Part I and II demonstrate on total is, once again, that good teams win, bad teams lose….regardless of opponent.  While performance versus sub-.500 teams and versus inner-division opponents might be nice talking points for talking heads, the reality is that (at least for the Braves) performance versus the two most prominent “adages” does NOT define how the team performed overall.

 

As always, for my 5 readers, comments, criticism, and debate are always welcome.

Taking Adages to Task: Part I

There are many theories about what makes a team good.  Most of the meaningful analysis looks at the performance of the individual players and then attempts to see whether a team is playing up to snuff.  However, there are many individuals: sportswriters, fans, analysts, whomever, who focus on the results a team achieves in particular situations.  There are two adages that you hear about all the time that have particularly intrigued me:

 

  1. You’ve gotta win the games versus the bad teams, and
  2. You’ve gotta win games versus the teams in your division.

 

I don’t per se disagree with either of these two things.  Namely, you are always better off winning a game than losing it. Results though are merely the culmination of all the little things that happen within a game and just dumb luck.  However, I still wanted to know: Is there real truth that winning games in these two categories is somehow more important than the rest of the games? Can a mediocre team overcome their mediocrity simply by looking like the 1927 Yankees versus the bad teams?

 

With these questions in mind, I set out to look at the Braves performance versus these categories of teams during their epic 14 year division run and then compare it to the “modern” Braves of 2006-present day.  At the end of everything, I don’t think there’s much to the mantras.  I present to you the data from this period as an empirical look at the Braves performance from 1991-2009 though so that you can make your own conclusions.

 

A couple of things to point out up front.  First, when examining #1 (“You’ve gotta win the games versus the bad teams), I chose to define this category as teams that finished with a record at the end of the year below .500.  It seemed to me, the teams you should handle the best are the teams that were in fact beat more often than they won over the course of an entire year.  If a team finished with exactly a .500 record, I excluded them from the data which I present.  Additionally, I did not include the Braves performances in interleague play.  Many times, the Braves might only have played 3 games versus such a team.  Additionally, if that interleague opponent had a below .500 record, it resulted primarily from games versus dissimilar opponents. I acknowledge that there probably were a few N.L. teams that finished with below .500 records which might be traced to their record in interleague play, but the majority of their games were played versus N.L. opponents, so I didn’t mind including them.

 

With respect to #2 (“You’ve gotta win games versus the teams in your division”), the analysis was somewhat complicated by the Braves switching from the West to the East and Major League Baseball’s switch to 3-division leagues and unbalanced schedules.  With those considerations in mind, I did not sort the data by team.  In other words, you won’t see the Braves record versus the Mets or versus the Marlins listed explicitly.  Instead, I simply list their performance versus inner-division opponents based on the where their opponent finished in the standings.  Thus, you’ll see the Braves record versus the “2nd place team” or the “5th place team” without reference to who exactly that team was.

 

Some like to point out particular troubles certain teams gave the Braves through the years. Most prominently, the Marlins come to mind. However, looking at the actual stats, I’m not convinced there was any real pattern there to begin with (more likely just selective memory winning out), but also, teams are not static. Regardless of how the Braves faired versus the Marlins, since there is little value in trying to make comparisons between the1997 World Series Champion version and the 1998 fire sale version, any struggles the Braves may have had versus a particular team will only be reflected by a diminished win percentage versus a particular “place.”

 

Finally, I should admit that I did not include data from the 1994 strike cut off season. For the Braves “dynasty” run, it provided just a strange outlier situation since that would be the sole season from 1991-2005 that the Braves would have any sort of record versus a team that finished “first” in the division. It all seemed fair that since the season was cut off arbitrarily it would be difficult to know exactly which teams were sub-.500 teams versus those that may have just hit a bad stretch right before the strike.  1995, despite the strike shortened season, is included since there was a pennant race and playoffs.  The only place that the 1994 data is included is as part of the benchmark for the Braves overall record and win percentage from 1991-2005.

 

My charts are split into two time periods: 1991-2005 and 2006-present.  The “present” data includes results through Wednesday August 5, 2009.  I acknowledge that the same “incomplete set” problem occurs with 2009 that I used to omit the 1994 results, but since 2006-present is a much shorter period of time with fewer results to work from, I wanted to expand the results I could use as much as possible. 

 

Phew, with all of that said, I’ll now present the various charts, and then discuss what I could and could not glean from all of this:

 

Table 1:  1991-2005 Braves results versus sub-.500 teams:  The label is fairly descriptive.  What you’ll see is the year, the Braves’ overall record by year, the Braves’ win percentage for the full year, the Braves’ record versus sub-.500 opponents, and the Braves’ win percentage versus those opponents.

 

Year

Overall Record

vs. sub-.500

Win Pct. Overall

Win Pct. sub .500

1991

94 – 68

58 – 44

58.0%

56.86%

1992

98 – 64

46 – 26

60.5%

63.89%

1993

104 – 58

55 – 20

64.2%

73.33%

1994

NA

NA

NA

NA

1995

90 – 54

54 – 31

62.5%

63.53%

1996

96 – 66

45 – 30

59.3%

60%

1997

101 – 61

64 – 16

62.3%

80%

1998

106 – 56

55 – 25

65.4%

68.75%

1999

103 – 59

62 – 36

63.6%

63.27%

2000

95 – 67

48 – 33

58.6%

59.26%

2001

88 – 74

41 – 27

54.3%

60.29%

2002

101 – 59

57 – 36

63.1%

61.29%

2003

101 – 61

37 – 16

62.3%

69.81%

2004

96 – 66

45 – 23

59.3%

66.18%

2005

90 – 72

29 -19

55.6%

60.42%

TOT

1363 – 885

696 – 382

60.63%

64.56%

 

I’ve bolded the highest totals for each category for ease of use.  Also, the reason the win percentages are a bit further developed for the sub-.500 teams is that I calculated all of those percentages myself while the overall percentage was just the win percentage as listed on baseball-reference.  Thanks to baseball-reference generally for providing all of the numbers which I used.

 

Table 2: 2006-2009 Braves results versus sub-.500 teams:  This sets forth the same data as Table 1, but for the “Modern” Braves as opposed to the “Dynasty” Braves.

 

Year

Overall Record

vs. sub-.500

Win Pct. Overall

Win Pct. sub .500

2006

79 – 83

43 – 40

48.8%

51.8%

2007

84 – 78

37 – 32

51.9%

53.6%

2008

72 – 90

22 – 29

44.4%

43.1%

2009

55 – 53

21 – 21

50.5%

50%

TOT

289 – 304

123 – 122

48.74%

50.20%

 

Table 3: 1991-2005 Braves Win Percentages vs. sub.-500:  Table 3 is going to present the same data as Table 1, but in a slightly different format.  I’m doing it to give everyone a different way of thinking about the numbers as well as to help me demonstrate a point.

 

Year

Total Games Played

Games v. sub.500

Pct. of total games v. sub. 500

Pct. of total wins v. sub. 500

1991

162

102

62.96%

61.70%

1992

162

72

44.44%

46.94%

1993

162

75

46.30%

52.88%

1994

NA

NA

NA

NA

1995

144

85

59.03%

60%

1996

162

75

46.30%

46.88%

1997

162

80

49.38%

63.37%

1998

162

80

49.38%

51.89%

1999

162

98

60.49%

60.19%

2000

162

81

50%

50.53%

2001

162

68

41.98%

46.59%

2002

160

93

58.13%

56.44%

2003

162

53

32.72%

36.63%

2004

162

68

41.98%

46.88%

2005

162

48

29.63%

32.22%

TOT

2248

1078

47.95%

51.06%

 

Table 4: 2006-2009 Braves Win Percentage vs. sub.-500:  And finally, here is the same numbers as Table 3 for the “Modern” Braves:

 

Year

Total Games Played

Games v. sub.500

Pct. of total games v. sub. 500

Pct. of total wins v. sub. 500

2006

162

83

51.23%

54.43%

2007

162

69

42.59%

44.05%

2008

162

51

31.48%

30.56%

2009

108

42

38.89%

38.89%

TOT

594

245

41.25%

42.56%

 

Observations:  I had no idea what I was going to find when I did this, but I think the results really speak to the fact that teams do not make up for deficiencies merely by playing “better” versus sub-.500 teams.  There were very few seasons in the entire data set that demonstrated the Braves upping their performance by “beating up” on the bad teams.  Instead, in most seasons, regardless of whether you’re looking at the “Dynasty” Braves or the “Modern Braves,” the performance versus the sub.-500 teams tended to mirror the team’s overall performance. 

 

For the entire period of 1991-2005, the team played basically 48% of its games versus sub-.500 teams and got basically 51% of its wins.  In other words, while the team did slightly better versus those teams, they by no means “beat up” on the bad ones in order to improve their record. 

 

The only thing that really is certain, is there’s no way before a season is over to even have an idea about how many games a team will have versus the “bad.”  This is reflected in Table 3.  The Braves played anywhere from 62.96% (1991) of its games versus the “bad” to just 29.63% (2005). It’s a bit ironic that the bookend years also bookend the difference in chances.  The chances are just unpredictable meaning the best strategy would, as one might expect, play every game to win it. 

 

So what about comparing the “Dynasty” Braves to the “Modern” Braves?  Is there any real difference?  “No” is the answer I come to.  Though the Braves as a whole were more mediocre or plain bad, their performance versus the “bad” teams still reflected their overall performance.  The major difference between the two is the number of chances the Braves seem to be getting versus the “bad” teams.  From 2006-2009, the Braves have played roughly 8% fewer games on average versus the “bad” teams.  This got me to thinking about why this is.  As best I can tell, there are three possible explanations for this phenomenon: 1) The National League being more even with fewer dominant teams meaning fewer teams finishing below .500.  However, looking at my hard data set, this does not seem to be the case.  The Braves have played roughly the same number of teams per season with a losing record, they’re just getting fewer chances. 

 

So, maybe it’s explained by 2) The N.L. East in particular has been better, and with unbalanced schedules the Braves are playing more games inner-division versus better opponents.  This might explain some of it, as the N.L. East does seem to be a little bit better in recent years.  To be fair, that’s merely an impression rather than a fact.  However, it then struck me that the simplest answer might be the right answer:

 

The Braves as a worse team in the time period both lose games versus an opponent of their own caliber in the analysis, AND they don’t beat the teams in the East as consistently to provide more games versus sub-.500 opponents.  While it’d take a lot more work to really know whether that’s true, it’s undeniable that the Braves beating everyone less over the “Modern” period plays a role in the number of chances they get versus sub-.500 teams.

 

To conclude this segment, let’s take a brief look at the one team from the “Dynasty” that did appreciably beat up on the lesser teams to beef up its own record:  The 1997 Braves.  Here for your consideration is the team’s record versus the individual bad teams they played that year:

 

Year

Team

W

L

WPct.

1997

MON

10

2

 

 

PHI

10

2

 

 

PIT

10

2

 

 

CIN

9

2

 

 

STL

8

3

 

 

CHC

9

2

 

 

SDP

8

3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TOT

64

16

0.8

 

That, to me, is amazing that they just whooped all of the bad teams winning at least 8 games versus every one of them and losing no more than 3 games to any of them.  The problem is…..teams just don’t do that on a regular basis (or at least the Braves) to make the mantra true that “you gotta win the games versus the bad teams.”  Instead good teams win, bad teams lose….no matter who the opponent.

 

I’ll explore the 2nd adage in a segment to come in the next few days.  Be patient though as I’m both in the process of moving and starting a new job which may delay my opportunity to write.  For now, as always, comments, feedback, and criticism are all welcome!

Ticked!

So, not only did my computer decide to arbitrarily die in the middle of typing a very long post, but Soriano blew a save again……I’ll be able to fix the computer turning off thing tomorrow, but that loss hurts.  Good night for now.

A Tribute to Skip Caray

Watching the Braves broadcast tonight, Joe Simpson reminded me that tonight is the one year anniversary of Skip Caray’s death. It seemed to be a fitting time to briefly talk about one of the announcers whose voices I associate so strongly with the Atlanta Braves.

Skip Caray was not always the most likeable personality to listen to on a broadcast. He was somewhat short-tempered, seemed to lose focus, and utilized an ascerbic wit that did not always translate to a television broadcast. That’s probably why I liked him so much.

Though I attempt to be neutral when posting/blogging online, in person, I’m a very sarcastic person. This can cause me a decent amount of discomfort around others as sarcasm is an acquired taste. There are many who find such “wit” to be mean-spirited or who simply do not get it at all. For those of us who utilize sarcasm, there’s nothing more frustrating than making such a comment and looking across to find a blank stare on the face of the person to whom the comment was addressed. It’s tough, and over time I find myself more selectively utilizing sarcasm depending on the audience I’m talking to.

Enter Skip Caray. There was something about Skip that made him fun to listen to. He had an opinion on just about everything, and if his co-announcer didn’t share the same opinion, he had no qualm telling them about it. In addition to that, he never backed off the sarcasm, and it did go over the average Braves listener on many an occasion. I was definitely a victim of his sense of humor. I can’t tell you how long it actually took me to realize that when he said: “And a nice catch was made by a fan from Macon” that he had no idea who that person was. Instead, I tended to wonder “how does he always know the person who caught the ball???” In his later years, Skip did seem to lose interest in the games at various points. He wasn’t a stats guy, and he wasn’t student of the history of the game. Instead, he was always Skip Caray, for better or worse.

Rather than rely upon the history or stats, Skip relied upon his own anecdotes from his time covering baseball. That is a quality which is much rarer than I ever appreciated when he passed away. However, he seemed to have an amazing memory for the stories which he experienced first hand, and he had a great ability to remember a story to go with a particular moment. It’s a skill that many of the older generation of broadcasters such as Skip and Vin Scully and Harry Kalas seemed to possess that has not translated as well to the current generation. The color analysts like Joe Morgan (sigh) attempt to recount anecdotes, but they lack the timing, delivery, and recognition of the relevance to make it worthwhile. Play-by-play broadcasters more and more seem to come from a “mold.” They’re smooth, they’re polished, and tend to know what the “right” (read: politically correct) thing to say is in a particular situation. Skip possessed none of those qualities.

Often rough around the edges and not afraid to speak to his mind, Caray was a joy to listen to that I miss dearly. I listen to the radio very little, and I listen to it even less now that the “Skip Caray Show” isn’t on. I can remember tuning into his show on the way home from work (generally while trapped on I-75) just to listen to him field questions from his audience. When Skip got a dumb question, or a question he’d answered a million times, or a question that just didn’t make sense, he didn’t refrain from venting his frustration. Be it a long sigh before answering or a short, curt response, Skip did not stray away from even letting his listeners know when they had crossed the line into idiocy. My Dad hated this quality about him….I loved it.

Not everyone can pull off what Skip Caray did. Many would just come off as jerks and be dismissed in a second. However, underlying his personality was a man who clearly loved baseball and invested himself in the team that he followed. He got criticized by those in his profession for being too biased towards “his” team, but that, to me, is the essence of what a hometown announcer should be. He rarely yelled or got excited, but at all times, he was Skip Caray.

On this one year anniversary of his death, I salute him for the unique and memorable individual that he was.

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